America. The southern colonies followed the prevailing law in England by employing a system of primogeniture in the case of intestacy.2 With two exceptions, Rhode Island and New York, the New England and Middle colonies followed the example of Kent by adopting multigeniture, subject to the rights of the surviving husband or wife (although it was common to follow Mosaic law, which provided a double portion for the eldest son and, in some cases, a half portion or less for daughters). In all cases, multigeniture was the law within a brief period following independence and the double portion provision, where in effect, was dropped.3 There have been scattered conjectures about why particular colonies deviated from the predominant English practice of primogeniture. These can be separated into two categories: philosophical/religious and economic reasons.4 Both interacted to affect colonists' initial prefer-2 Widows had "dower" rights that provided them with a certain portion of land (often one-third of the landed estate), which they could neither give away nor sell. In much of the country, a husband could not eliminate dower rights by selling or giving away his land. ences for inheritance laws, and it is difficult to test separately for their impact. We conjecture, however, that with the possible exceptions of New-York and Rhode Island, the maintenance of the same inheritance law in each colony over the entire colonial period was the result of the consistency of inheritance laws with economic efficiency. We suggest that it was fortuitous that, in general, religious/philosophical motivation concurred with economic interests.
In our model of the colonial legislative process, we assume that since multigeniture required active legislation whereas primogeniture would prevail in the absence of legislation, a necessary but not sufficient condition for multigeniture was a strong central government. We further assume that laws are enacted and maintained if they are in the interests of those with political power-the wealthy residents. The wealthy cared about intestate laws since they were subject to the widely observed reluctance to write a will, uncertainty about when death would occur, and the high cost of writing a will. While wills were, nevertheless, apparently common in early colonial history, it was not unusual for wills generally to follow the provisions of intestate law.5 For example, even when intestate law provides for multigeniture and it is desired that the estate be divided, the division mandated by law may not be acceptable. Surprisingly, many wills even followed exactly the provisions of intestacy law.6 Further, there are many cases where it was desired that the eldest son inherit the farm and primogeniture intestacy laws were in effect but intestacy was associated with a type of primogeniture that was unacceptable. For example, in Virginia wills were sometimes used even when primogeniture was preferred, since under intestate law the eldest son received the land but none of the slaves or personal property.7 Most importantly, although testacy was a simple matter in the early colonial period, it became increasingly complicated and costly over time. The result was that by the end of the period testate transfers were rare.8 Further evidence consistent with the view that intestacy laws were not superfluous was the fight that southern aristocrats waged in an effort to maintain them and the costs the Puritans incurred to have their charter signed in Kent where a form of multigeniture was legal.9 Obviously, had the legislation been costless to evade, people would not have expended resources to maintain or change the laws.
The issue we examine is what factors encouraged those with economic and political power to maintain a particular inheritance system. We hypothesize that legislators acted in the interests of their wealthy Multigeniture provided motivation for family farm labor. Labor supervision costs of family labor are lower under multigeniture since each child, knowing that he or she will receive a share of the assets in the future, has an incentive to work toward improving the estate. Of course, the larger the estate and the fewer the number of siblings, the greater is the motivation to work hard. Even in large families, however, the free rider problem is minimized by the threat of disinheritance. Multigeniture, although it provides a work incentive, leads to smaller agricultural production units than does primogeniture. To this extent, economies of scale, when present, cannot be captured.
Under what circumstances will the benefits of economies of scale outweigh the costs of employing a work force not motivated by the expectation of inheritance? We propose that large plantations arose in the South-and hence preference for primogeniture in order to prevent fragmentation-because of the South's comparative advantage in monitoring slave work effort.'0 The South's comparative advantage in supervising slave work effort rested on climatic conditions that allowed the cultivation of labor-intensive crops such as rice and tobacco. We maintain that supervisory costs are lower the greater the proximity of workers and supervisors." Economies of scale in monitoring were the basis for economies of scale in southern plantation agriculture. In the land-extensive general farming of the North, supervision of slave work effort would be more costly than in the South because tasks tended to be more diverse and there was considerable spatial separation between workers and supervisors. Since the costs of monitoring slave work performance were less in the South, the South outbid the North for slaves and family farms emerged in the North accompanied with multigeniture to motivate family members to remain on the farm and work with little supervision. Primogeniture, by fostering large estates and agricultural wealth, permitted easier access to political power. Political power in turn may yield high psychic or monetary benefits. Across colonies, the greater the ability to transform agricultural wealth into political power, the greater the incentive to favor primogeniture.
The above hypotheses imply that: (1) if legislators were motivated by desires to maintain efficient agricultural units, we should observe a positive association between primogeniture and plantations and multigeniture and family farms; and (2) if legislators in the upper tail of the wealth distribution derived their income from agriculture, primogeniture would more likely prevail.
Evidence consistent with the motivation to maintain political power and hence, primogeniture, includes the observed tendency for the wealthy in the South to be engaged in agriculture, whereas in the North the very wealthy were more frequently engaged in commerce. Further evidence of the desire to maintain political power is found in the debates surrounding the abolition of entails and primogeniture. It was the landed aristocrats who advocated the retention of primogeniture.'2 This evidence of a desire for political power does not preclude the existence of a motivation for efficient farm units. Since the southern states favored primogeniture, where both plantations prevailed and the very wealthy owned plantations, it is an empirical question whether it was the desire for an optimal size farm or the desire for political power that dominated. A test that can differentiate between the two hypotheses would be whether plantation owners of multiple estates kept ownership intact by giving all estates to the eldest son or simply kept the operating units intact by giving plantations to more than one child. The latter observation is consistent with the incentive for primogeniture arising from a desire to maintain the most efficient agricultural units, whereas the former observation includes the desire for political power as well The existence of primogeniture in New York is also consistent with our model. One might expect that New York, because of its Dutch heritage, would favor multigeniture, because in Holland intestate law mandated equal division of estates. Despite its roots, New York accepted primogeniture after England usurped Dutch rule. The rationale, we believe, lies with the reliance on nonfamily labor by the wealthy estate holders.
As a result of its Dutch ancestry, New York had many large estates called patroonships. The prevalence of these estates is at issue, but there appears little doubt that the patroons were amongst the colony's wealthiest and politically most influential residents.'6 One acquired a patroonship by establishing a colony of fifty or more people over the age of fifteen. By law, these people were bound to stay on the estate of the patroon for a certain number of years. The patroons, therefore, did not rely on family labor but instead had a sort of large-scale indentured servant system.'7 Since they did not need to worry about family labor incentive problems and their landed wealth presumably conveyed political power, the passive acceptance of primogeniture in New York is consistent with our model. Rhode Island, on the other hand, may have passively accepted primogeniture not because it was the inheritance system most consistent with agricultural efficiency but rather because it lacked a strong central government to take the necessary positive action to enact a multigeniture intestate law. This conjecture is consistent with evidence indicating that Rhode Island may not have enforced primogeniture.'8 Before Rhode Island was formed as a colony, it consisted of four independent townships. Charles M. Andrews points out that throughout its colonial history, Rhode Island was threatened from the outside by Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Plymouth and from within by the separate townships.'9 We argue, therefore, that the law of primogeni- Overall, the evidence we have presented is consistent with the hypothesis that the motive of agricultural efficiency influenced legislators' preferences for either primogeniture or multigeniture. In the South, primogeniture fostered large estates, able to reap the benefits of economies of scale because of low slave monitoring costs in the cultivation of rice and tobacco. Multigeniture in the North was compatible with family farms and provided a positive work incentive for children.
INHERITANCE LAWS AND POPULATION GROWTH
There are a variety of demographic effects typically associated with the different inheritance practices. Scholars have argued that primogeniture should lead to low levels of population growth as all but the eldest son feel pressure to postpone marriage, to eventually have fewer children and to move to other areas. On the other hand, multigeniture, by providing opportunities for all of the children, should result in more rapid population growth through little outmigration, a high proportion married, early marriages, and large families.' These demographic effects were not observed in colonial America, we argue, because the impact of inheritance laws on population growth was insignificant compared to the role played by land availability. When land is easily available, it is possible for younger children to marry and to set up farms of their own, thereby leading to similar high rates of population growth under multigeniture or primogeniture. If, however, land is scarce, we expect population growth to decline under both systems of inheritance. Under primogeniture the large families of the eldest sons would be counterbalanced by the small families and outmigration of the other children. Similarly, multigeniture may encourage all of the children to marry early but, if available land is scarce and farms are already small and unproductive as a result of prior fragmentation, economic pressures may lead them to limit their family size.
In addition, if parents practicing multigeniture sought to provide each of their children with assets, then the fertility decline associated with land scarcity would be enhanced.22 In an economy dominated by agriculture, this motive would imply providing farmland or the funds needed to purchase farmland. This "bequest" hypothesis implies a variant of multigeniture in which population growth is constrained by the desire to transfer a farm of some minimum efficient size.23 The ability to satisfy a bequest aspiration falls as land becomes scarcer, thereby decreasing the demand for children so as not to exceed the desired number of heirs.24
In sum, land availability may alter the typically assumed demographic results of inheritance practices. It has generally been assumed that primogeniture will lead to lower rates of population growth because of the incentive for postponement of marriages and outmigration of all but the eldest son. Under conditions of abundant land, however, we expect that primogeniture and multigeniture will lead to similar rates of population growth. Under primogeniture, because cheap farm land is available, even though sons will not receive an inheritance, marriage need not be postponed or the number of children desired reduced. Similarly, under multigeniture there is no incentive to limit population growth when land is readily available.
Under conditions of land scarcity the incentives under primogeniture will lead to low population growth, and we expect similar population growth patterns under multigeniture, if there existed social pressure not to bequeath inefficient small farms. In the latter case, impartibility will become the dominant practice, parents will have incentives to reduce fertility, and all sons except the one who receives the farm will have incentives to migrate. If a bequest motive is absent, we expect to observe higher population growth rates under multigeniture than under primogeniture.
Although data limitations make it extremely difficult to evaluate our hypotheses systematically, a brief examination of the available evidence provides a rough test of the conjectures presented above. This evidence consists of detailed studies of particular areas of the country, as well as population estimates for each of the colonies. Greven, in tracing the history of four generations in colonial Andover, Massachusetts, provides valuable insight into the relationship between land availability, inheritance practices, and population growth.25 In the mid-seventeenth century, available land was relatively abundant and large families and little outmigration combined to create rapid population growth. The ensuing population explosion, however, created land pressures that threatened the ability of parents to continue to provide land for their children. Outmigration increased, birth rates fell, and, although some parents were still able to establish their sons on family land, it became increasingly common to establish children in trades. Although partibility was a prominent aspect of inheritance practices when land was readily available, as land became more scarce impartibility became increasingly common. Specifically, it appears that parents were reluctant to partition farmland below a minimum level of about thirty acres.26 Patricia J. Tracy's study of eighteenth-century Northampton, Massachusetts reinforced Greven's findings.27 Her evidence indicates that men married three years later in the eighteenth century than did their counterparts in the seventeenth century, a period when land was relatively abundant.28
The interpretation of population statistics across colonies and over time is complicated by difficulty in differentiating between the relative impact of natural increase, internal migration, and immigration. Nevertheless, comparing data on the decennial rate of population increase with a measure of land availability and information on intestate inheritance laws provides further insight into the role of these factors in accounting for population growth. Table 2 This simple analysis provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the availability of land rather than inheritance laws had the dominant effect on population growth rates.30 Had the choice under conditions of land scarcity been between primogeniture and multigeniture without a bequest motive, then we would expect that the demographic effects of inheritance practices would have been larger. It seems that the existence of a bequest motive, accompanied as it appears to have been by the maintenance of efficient farm size, played a role in reducing the potential impact of differences in inheritance practices.
